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Este artículo analiza el último tramo del exilio uruguayo en los años de autoritaris-
mo en ese país. Se centra en las transformaciones resultantes del comienzo de la apertura
política, a partir de 1980, que llevaron a los exiliados a trasladar el centro de su atención
hacia los acontecimientos domésticos. Esto implicó una cierta revisión de sus formas de
denunciar las violaciones de derechos humanos que ocurrían en su país, especialmente en
relación al balance entre las exigencias de “verdad” y “justicia” sobre los hechos del pasa-
do reciente. Se estudian también los cambiantes y complejos equilibrios que los exiliados
fueron estableciendo entre su militancia política nacional y su activismo de denuncia trans-
nacional en la etapa en que dentro de Uruguay se negociaba una salida democrática.
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This article analyzes the positions of the Uruguayan exiles in the last years of autho-
ritarianism in Uruguay. It focuses on the transformations that resulted from the opening up
of political activity inside the country, starting in 1980, which forced the exiles to direct
their attention to the domestic arena. This involved some adjustments in their transnational
denouncing activity of human rights violations in their country, particularly regarding the
balance between demands of “truth-telling” and “justice”. In addition, the article consi-
ders the complex and changing relationships between national and transnational activism
in exile politics, in a time when military leaders and politicians negotiated a transition back
to a democratic regime in Uruguay.
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In contrast to other Latin American countries, the authoritarian
government installed in the early seventies was the first military-backed
regime of the twentieth century in Uruguay. A century of civilian rule
1 This article was written in 2004, while I was a post-doctoral fellow at the International
Center for Advanced Studies, New York University. I thank Marilyn Young, Allen Hunter, and all my
co-fellows in the “Project on the Cold War as a Global Conflict”. I am also grateful to my friends
Eduardo Elena, Aldo Marchesi, and Gerardo Leibner for their insightful comments to my work. This
project began at Columbia University, where I completed my PhD in 2003, and was eventually publi-
shed as a book both in English (Routledge, 2005) and in Spanish (Correo del Maestro/CEIU, 2006).
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based on the joint participation of the two major or “traditional” parties
(Colorado and Nacional or Blanco) had shaped an indulgent national ima-
ge, bolstered by the regularity of democratic procedures, a social welfare
system, growing economic markets, and the development of a large urban
population. In the sixties, both the Uruguayan economy and political insti-
tutions experienced a crisis, which led to increasing social and political
polarization, including the outbreak of guerrilla actions. In June 1973, the
Armed Forces overthrew democratic rule, while the majority of the politi-
cal system was unable to respond. The new government targeted unions
and several other organizations, intervened in the national university, and
restricted freedom of the press and association as well as party political
activity. Repression was intense. To the dead and disappeared were added
thousands of persons who were accused of “political crimes” and jailed.
Many were fired from their government jobs for political reasons. Large-
scale emigration and exile were consequences of this situation. Since the
late sixties (and increasingly after the coup), thousands of activists and lea-
ders from Marxist and other leftist parties, including guerrillas and direct
action groups, abandoned the country fearing for their lives and freedoms.
In the period immediately after the coup, Buenos Aires became a cen-
ter of Uruguayan opposition to the military-backed regime, with the parti-
cipation of many leftist leaders and activists, as well as some politicians
from the traditional parties. From exile, they had to develop new strategies
to confront the authoritarian government and cope with increasing repre-
ssion, initially in their country and subsequently in Argentina. During their
first period of exile (1973-1976), the Uruguayan leftists strove to under-
stand their recent experiences and redefined the goals and means of politi-
cal participation. Nevertheless, they were still sanguine about the prospects
of changing the Uruguayan situation and maintained their revolutionary
goals. The 1976 military coup in Argentina transformed Buenos Aires into
a deadly trap for thousands of Latin American refugees, including not only
Uruguayans but also Chileans who were escaping the Pinochet regime ins-
talled in late 1973. The realization that radical activism would not longer
be tolerated in the Southern Cone led to a slow but clear change in leftist
politics, with many doubting the possibility of short-term revolutionary
social change in their country and the larger region.
Attempts to gain support at the international level and work with
human rights groups in Europe and the United States played an important
role in this evolution. These experiences contributed to the creation of a
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transnational network devoted to denouncing human rights abuses in coun-
tries under repressive right-wing regimes. This type of cooperation had vir-
tually no precedents among the Uruguayan leftist exiles, who had pre-
viously characterized their new allies as either “tools of U.S. imperialism”
or irrelevant to their understanding of social change. In a similar vein, the
human rights groups’ emphasis on the defense of the integrity of the body
contrasted sharply with the Uruguayan leftists’ previous conceptions of
activism, which made repression part of their anticipated political experien-
ce and exalted the militants who endured abuses. A quick look at the exi-
les’ activities between 1973 and 1976 shows that their belief in the nece-
ssity of personal sacrifice for the sake of higher revolutionary goals began
to conflict with the ethics of human rights, which rejected any practice that
damaged the body. It is worth noting that the Uruguayans, like other South
American leftists who engaged in human rights work in these years, came
from a country with long-lasting democratic traditions and a relatively inte-
grated society. These educated, middle-class militants thought of themsel-
ves as possessors of both constitutionally and internationally protected
rights. Although these issues had not so far centered their political activity,
they were well-positioned to engage with human rights discourse.
While these changes were under way, a new and unprecedented wave
of repression in the region forced most Uruguayan exiles to flee to other
countries in the Americas and Europe. In their new surroundings, they soon
began to participate in local committees and solidarity groups, as well as to
re-establish the several parties, coalitions, and factions of the Uruguayan
left. The leaders often voiced their desire to achieve the unification of the
opposition, but divergent evaluations of their recent past, characterizations
of the current regime, and ideas about what would happen after its much
anticipated demise prevented the creation of a permanent political alliance.
Leftist activists usually worked together locally, but the groups they belon-
ged to could not bridge their discrepancies with each other or with other
opposition groups both inside and outside Uruguay. At the same time,
many exiles participated in the growing human rights transnational net-
works and skillfully used their language and procedures. But most of the
exiles were more interested in debating tactics and strategies of political
change in Uruguay than in transnational activism per se, which was usually
thought of as a means to an end.
Exile politics changed dramatically in the years of transition from
authoritarian rule to democracy in Uruguay, beginning in 1980 with the fai-
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lure of the military to impose an authoritarian constitution and ending in
the national elections of November 1984 with the triumph of the Partido
Colorado. Although the Armed Forces still repressed the opposition and
censured public debates, they were forced to open negotiations and sanc-
tion legal mechanisms to reorganize political participation. For the exiles,
it was novel that political initiative moved back to Uruguay. While in pre-
vious years many relevant episodes in leftist politics had occurred abroad,
after 1980 the main political developments took place inside the country.
Although the exiles continued organizing meetings and lobbying activities,
their chief concern became to support the growing opposition forces in
Uruguay. Pivotal to understanding this process is what scholars of demo-
cratization call “transitional justice”: both “demands for an official recog-
nition of the truth about human rights violations committed by the outgoing
military regimes, and for the punishment of those guilty of committing and
ordering these violations”.2 In the final years of authoritarianism in
Uruguay, powerful social movements placed these concerns at the center of
their mobilization efforts, while political parties, including many leftist
groups, tended to consider some human rights claims as restraining factors
in their negotiations with the military authorities. The exiles had been pio-
neers among Uruguayan leftists in addressing these issues years before the
creation of the first human rights group inside the country in 1981.
Transitional politics brought a series of changes to their positions. These
adjustments are the focus of this paper.
Transitional Human Rights
On November 30, 1980, the Uruguayan government held a national
plebiscite on a proposed new constitution to institutionalize the ruling
authoritarian regime. In September, a similar attempt in Chile had given
Pinochet another eight years in power and tight control over a future transi-
tion to democracy. In Uruguay, however, defeat in the plebiscite produced
an “unexpected opening” of the political situation.3 The military reconside-
red their plans for future actions, reorganized the government, and sanctio-
2 Barahona de Brito, Alexandra: Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America:
Uruguay and Chile, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, page 1.
3 See González, Luis Eduardo: “Uruguay 1980-1981: An unexpected opening”, Latin
American Research Review, 18:3, 1983.
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ned some legal tools to allow for the parties’ re-involvement in politics.
Legislation was passed in 1982 to “regenerate” politics, calling for internal
elections to appoint new leaders in the traditional parties. The leftist coali-
tion Frente Amplio (FA), although officially banned, found ways to partici-
pate: some sectors followed the imprisoned leader Líber Seregni and deci-
ded to cast blank ballots to show their enduring appeal among the citizenry,
while others, especially the communists, were committed to their alliance in
exile with the Blanco leader Wilson Ferreira Aldunate and called to support
his group. The elections were another political set-back for the military,
since opposition sectors obtained a large majority of the vote.
This forced the authorities to enter into formal discussions with the
opposition. A sharp economic slump in late 1982 furthered this decision,
since it resulted in the hostility of sectors of the elite and favored the deve-
lopment of powerful social movements. After some failed encounters bet-
ween politicians and military leaders in 1983, long and arduous negotia-
tions led to the “acuerdo del Club Naval”, which opened the way for the
November 1984 national election. Led by Seregni, the majority of the left
approved of these negotiations and ad hoc legalized representatives took
part in the agreement. The main reason why the military accepted the invol-
vement of the left was the refusal of Ferreira Aldunate to let his party nego-
tiate unless he was allowed to run for president. At the time of the negotia-
tions, he and his son Juan Raúl had returned to Uruguay and been
imprisoned upon arrival. In the absence of the Blancos, only the left could
offer legitimacy to what would otherwise have been an agreement between
the military and just one political party. This was also the reasoning of
the Colorado leader and future president Julio María Sanguinetti, plus the
chance of getting rid of his only real competitor. Many in the left took
the opportunity to get back into the legal game of politics and decided to
break with the radicalized Blancos. Although some leaders and parties
were banned from the elections, including Ferreira Aldunate and Seregni,
the new government took over in March 1985 with a complete acceptance
by the political forces.
All these dramatic changes inside Uruguay led the exiles to reconsi-
der their human rights activities in a new light. In previous years, leftist
groups and parties acting abroad had devoted great efforts to protest human
rights violations, alleging it was the best way of helping defeat the autho-
ritarian regime in their country. The exiles did not abandon their lobbying
efforts after 1980, but the transitional period (1980-1984) redefined the
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overall meaning of their transnational activities in national leftist politics.
Besides, the eighties were not a favorable time to protest abuses on a glo-
bal scale. While in the seventies the U.S. government, the United Nations
(UN), and the Organization of American States (OAS) had supported stron-
ger international standards for human rights, concern about these matters
declined in the following decade, mainly because of substantial changes in
U.S. foreign policy.
Already familiar with the complex human rights mechanisms of the
UN, the OAS, and other international organizations, leftist Uruguayan exi-
les kept presenting their cases and pressing claims before different commi-
ttees and commissions in the early eighties. But they were no longer enthu-
siastic about the results of these already routine activities. Their journals
and newsletters began to pay less and less attention to the decisions of the
UN and the OAS. Irate critiques of the Reagan administration and U.S.
policies in Latin America instead flooded these publications, often refe-
rring to former president Carter’s human rights approach as a short-lived
respite from the uninterrupted support of the United States to oppressive
right-wing governments. They protested the restoration of aid and assistan-
ce to the Uruguayan regime and rejected all attempts to portray the “unex-
pected opening” as an achievement of the new administration’s “quiet
diplomacy” and influence over the alleged “moderate factions” among the
military.4 In addition, many of the exiles’ allies in the United States had
shifted their attention towards the more pressing situation of Central
America, somewhat weakening the Uruguayans’ access to foreign policy
makers in Washington.
It would be inaccurate however to attribute the exiles’ diminished
concern about the international human rights system solely to their percep-
tions of global politics. The main reason for redefining their activities was
the political change in Uruguay after the 1980 plebiscite. Once political
participation was more accessible inside the country, the exiles reoriented
their efforts towards backing up internal mobilization against the regime.
As explained in one of their periodicals,
4 For U.S. position on Uruguay, see, for instance, Senator Paul Laxalt’s report in U.S.,
Congress, Senate, Developing an American Consensus, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 1982, pages 31-34.
For the exiles’ critique, see “Dialogue Nord (USA)–Sud (Uruguay)”, Uruguay Informations, October
1981, pages 15-16, in Uruguay: North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) Archive of Latin
Americana, Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, Del., 1998, reel 3 (hereafter cited as NACLA); and
Rodney Arismendi, “La perra otra vez en celo: La política latinoamericana de Reagan a la luz de un
documento del Consejo Interamericano de Seguridad”, Estudios, 78, March 1981, pages 8-19.
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“From now on, the task… [of the exiles] will not only be [related to] those who su-
ffer repression. There is now...an advancing popular movement that, slowly but
surely, regains initiative at the diverse levels of the political and social fight against
the dictatorship. And thus the activities of the exiles should take into account these
changes”.5
After some initial disagreements concerning the alliance of exiled
communists and socialists with the Blanco leader Ferreira Aldunate, poli-
tical initiative shifted back in the early eighties to the FA leadership inside
Uruguay, which defined the chief task of the new period as regaining spa-
ce in national politics and taking part in a negotiated way out of the autho-
ritarian regime. Like all other negotiators, the leaders of the left delibera-
tely avoided bringing human rights violations to the table, knowing that the
issue would most likely elicit irreconcilable differences, since the military
rejected any kind of “revisionism”.6 According to the strategy advanced by
Seregni (recently released after eight years in prison) and other leaders,
positioning the FA as a credible political option meant embracing a conci-
liatory approach that precluded strong human rights claims from their
immediate platform. Even before party delegates achieved the final agree-
ment with the military in August 1984 (which paved the way for elections
in November), this strategy led to an internal rift in the left. In one camp
were those who favored negotiations to accelerate the recovery of basic
civil and political rights. In the other, those who called for increasing popu-
lar mobilization to achieve more radical goals, including prosecuting alle-
ged human rights violators.
In exile, the main representatives of the first position were the co-
mmunists and the socialists, two core members of the FA who generally
restrained from openly demanding penalizing actions against those accu-
sed of human rights abuses. In the early eighties, together with their
Blanco allies in the Convergencia Democrática en Uruguay (CDU), they
lobbied foreign governments and international organizations, particularly
5 “Una tarea de todos”, Informaciones y Documentos, June 1981, page 3, in Centro de
Estudios Interdisciplinarios del Uruguay, Facultad the Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación,
Universidad de la República, Montevideo (hereafter cited as CEIU).
6 In September 1982, for instance, president general Álvarez said he wanted to “discard any
thought or attempt to proceed with a revision of the actions and of the difficult and painful contribution
of the Armed Forces, be it now or in the future”. Cited in Barahona, A.: Human Rights and
Democratization in Latin America..., page 95. Later in 1983 and 1984, efforts in Argentina to try tho-
se responsible of human rights abuses surely encouraged the Uruguayan military to seek guarantees as
part of the transitional process.
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in the United States, to get support for democratization in Uruguay at the
highest possible level. They denounced repression against the opposition
and worked to improve the situation of human rights in their country. But
they did not propose any concrete formula to prosecute those allegedly res-
ponsible for these violations.7 Party politics always framed their activities.
The CDU, in particular, was a temporary alliance of political groups oppo-
sing the authoritarian regime with a moderate, short-term common plat-
form, which privileged proposals for procedural democracy and eluded
potentially divisive debates. Later in the eighties, once political participa-
tion broadened inside the country, each group began to advance its own
strategy and their joint work became controversial. After the collapse of
the CDU in April 1984, the communists and the socialists endorsed the
negotiating approach of the FA, which did not marry well with the impul-
se toward punishing the accused of human rights violations. The Partido
Comunista Uruguayo (PCU), a strong and well-organized party both in
exile and underground in Uruguay, kept protesting political imprisonment
and other forms of abuse, as well as publicizing the extreme repression
endured during the authoritarian period. But it did not even mention the
issue of transitional justice. In fact, they ended up joining Seregni and the
majority of the left in tacitly relinquishing demands for an immediate and
complete amnesty for political prisoners, which would have allegedly
delayed a transitional agreement.8
In contrast to this dominant position, other leftists both inside and out-
side Uruguay argued against participating in ongoing negotiations with the
military, calling for increased popular mobilization, associating with the
social movements, and insisting on discussions of what kind of democratic
regime would substitute the authoritarian one prior to defining concrete
transitional strategies. They believed that leftist groups should defend alter-
native social arrangements not only as long-term goals, but also as part of
their current dealings with the rest of the opposition. Likewise, they deman-
ded some kind of commitment on part of all the political parties to promo-
7 As the Blanco leader Juan Raúl Ferreira, president of the CDU, said in early 1982: “We are
more interested in the question of democratic perspectives [for our country] than in denouncing [abu-
ses]”. Ferreira, J. R.: “Uruguay sabe lo que quiere”, Boletín Informativo CDU, June 1982, page 5, in
NACLA 4.
8 In order to facilitate the participation of the left in the negotiations, though, the military
agreed to release 411 prisoners who had served more than half of their sentences. For this and other
provisos intended to “create conditions for dialogue”, see Gillespie, C.: Negotiating Democracy...,
pages 171-175.
VANIA MARKARIAN
AEA, 64, 1, enero-junio, 2007, 111-140. ISSN: 0210-5810118
te justice and “truth-telling”. In their view, Seregni, the communists, and
other pro-negotiating sectors of the FA had tacitly given up not only on pro-
secuting those accused of human rights violations during the authoritarian
period, but also on their call for total and immediate amnesty. In the words
of exiled leader Enrique Erro, the pact was a “total capitulation”: “The
Frente Amplio should not have accepted negotiations with thousands of
proscribed citizens, including political parties which compose the FA, and
political prisoners”.9 In Uruguay, the majority of the FA had a hard time
trying to prove both to the more radical leftists and to the public at large
that participation in the pact did not imply an abdication of principle. They
denied acquiescing to an alleged “private understanding” between the
Colorados and the military, in which the Colorado leader (and future presi-
dent) Julio María Sanguinetti supposedly assured general Hugo Medina
that he would personally see to it that the military would be protected. The
more radical factions of the left, however, thought that the transitional pact
had indeed involved some kind of tacit commitment to lay aside claims for
“truth” and punishment of human rights violators. The main representati-
ves of this position in exile were the Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo
(PVP) and Erro’s group, which in 1984 adhered to the newly created
Izquierda Democrática Independiente, becoming part of the FA but not
ratifying participation in the agreement.
In previous years, Erro, the PVP, and other smaller groups had repea-
tedly expressed their opposition to granting any kind of reciprocal amnesty
to the accused of human rights abuses. The PVP had been particularly acti-
ve in calling for “justice and punishment” since the late seventies, insis-
tently demanding investigation and prosecution of both civilian and mili-
tary personnel accused of abuses. In the transitional period, the documents
of this group often charged the “tolerated opposition” with acquiescing to
not exposing the situation of “the political prisoners, the hostages, the dead,
and the disappeared”.10 The PVP had long called for investigation on the
9 Erro’s manuscript, September 29, 1984, reproduced in Caula, Nelson: El diario de Enrique
Erro: La cárcel, el exilio y la transición, Rosebud, Montevideo, 1998, page 201. At this point, there
were still 3,000 citizens banned from political participation and some 300 political prisoners, but some
steps had been taken to allow for the controlled rehabilitation of the FA. See Gillespie, C.: Negotiating
Democracy…, pages 171-175.
10 See “El voto en blanco en las elecciones internas”, September 1982, in PVP, La lucha con-
tra la dictadura: Documentos 1977-1984, Compañero, Montevideo, 1992, page 177. For Erro’s posi-
tion, see his letter to “Gómez y Flía...,” reproduced in Caula, N.: El diario de Enrique Erro..., page 140,
and interview in journal Aportes, December 1982, reproduced in Ibídem, page 148.
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cases of Uruguayans disappeared in Buenos Aires and was an early deman-
der of amnesty for all political prisoners. The group upheld a broad coali-
tion for amnesty, welcoming those who pressed the issue for humanitarian
and juridical reasons, though stating that its own reasons were “principally
political,” and articulating a radical proposal which excluded any form of
mutual “pardon”.11 As part of this effort, the PVP gave substantial support
to the Secrétariat International de Juristes pour l’Amnistie en Uruguay
(SIJAU), a pioneer organization in framing the struggle against the
Uruguayan regime in the language and methods of human rights transna-
tional activism. Founded in Paris in 1977, the SIJAU had issued a call for
amnesty which had been publicly endorsed by all the major leftist parties
and groups acting in exile.12
In the early eighties, the SIJAU continued to play a pivotal role,
opening up debate on the far-reaching effects of authoritarianism and
calling for concrete solutions for a series of central issues in transitional
politics. Once in São Paulo in 1983 and again in Buenos Aires in 1984,
European and Latin American jurists, lawyers, and human rights activists
were convened to discuss current political developments in Uruguay. In
both occasions, they demanded the integral restoration of democratic con-
ditions, called for amnesty for political prisoners, and urged debate on the
future role of the Armed Forces. The São Paulo meeting was remarkable
since it advanced the first detailed proposal for amnesty according to both
international human rights law and Uruguayan legal provisions prior to the
authoritarian regime. The exiled Uruguayan lawyers Alejandro and
Mercedes Artucio delivered a paper on the juridical foundations and pre-
dictable effects of promulgating an amnesty in Uruguay. After stressing the
comprehensive character of the proposal, which involved the complete res-
toration of civil and political rights as well as reparations to the victims of
abuses, the two lawyers specified its precise meaning for political priso-
ners, whom they deemed the most pressing human rights concern in
Uruguay, the Latin American country with the highest rate of such priso-
ners. They differentiated amnesty from “pardon”, opposed involvement by
11 See “Por la amnistía general e irrestricta para todos los presos y perseguidos por el régi-
men,” May 1983, in PVP, La lucha contra la dictadura…, pages 199-216. See also Cores, Hugo: “Un
desafío para la izquierda,” June 1983, in Ibídem, pages 217-239.
12 For endorsements of amnesty proposal, see replies to survey in Federatie Uruguay
Komitees, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam (hereafter cited as FUK-IISH).
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the military justice, and called for the restitution of all powers to ordinary
judges to prosecute human rights violations.13
A year after the São Paulo meeting, the SIJAU organized another con-
ference in Buenos Aires, where a group of lawyers, jurists, and activists
again got together to debate the implications of the transitional processes
to democracy in Uruguay and Paraguay. The recently reinstalled democra-
tic regime in Argentina offered a hospitable arena for those opposing
authoritarianism in the region to debate strategies, seek mutual support, and
compare experiences in a climate of optimism. In the case of Uruguay, this
environment allowed for fruitful exchange among those fighting for human
rights inside and outside the country. The Buenos Aires meeting clearly
showed that the exiles were no longer alone in their denouncing activities.
Before 1980, they had been the chief disseminators of information on abu-
ses, since the small groups of relatives who were active in Uruguay had
weak ties to the transnational human rights networks. The Servicio de Paz
y Justicia (SERPAJ, Service for Peace and Justice) came to fill this gap in
1981, when the Jesuit priest Luis Pérez Aguirre gathered a group of
Christians to protest abuses. They embraced a rather vehement approach to
remind other social and political actors that “Jesus’ pardon did never
banish the fight for justice [and] never feared speaking out the truth and
taking sides”.14 They used this language to call for popular mobilization,
linking up with other social movements instead of establishing substantial
ties with the political parties.15 They also tried to reach outside Uruguay,
taking advantage of the exiles’ previous transnational activism.16 Inside the
country, they promoted the organization of groups of relatives of political
prisoners and disappeared persons. SERPAJ was declared illegal in 1983
after organizing a hunger strike to end the stalemate in the talks between
13 See Artucio, Alejandro and Mercedes: “La amnistía en el Uruguay: Efectos jurídicos, fun-
damentos, alcance y aplicación”, in SIJAU, Coloquio sobre Uruguay y Paraguay: La transición del
estado de excepción a la democracia, EBO, Montevideo, 1985, pages 213-225. For the São Paulo
event, see SIJAU, Colloque sur les fondements juridiques d’une véritable ouverture démocratique en
Uruguay - São Paulo, 17, 18 et 19 juin 1982, SIJAU, Paris, 1983.
14 Amnistía y reconciliación nacional: Propuesta del Servicio de Paz y Justicia, SERPAJ,
Montevideo, 1983, page 14, in Princeton University Latin American Pamphlet Collection: Human and
Civil Rights in Uruguay, 1983-1988, Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, Del., 1989.
15 For social movements and human rights claims in the Southern Cone, see Jelin, Elizabeth:
“Los sentidos de la conmemoración”, in Jelin, E. (ed.): Las conmemoraciones: Las disputas en las
fechas “in-felices”, Siglo XXI, Madrid, 2002, page 247.
16 See, for instance, letters from SERPAJ and Luis Pérez Aguirre to Federatie Uruguay
Komitees, November 15, 1983, and June 10, 1984, in FUK-IISH.
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the parties and the military and was only reorganized in 1984 during the
electoral campaign. In September, a representative of the still-illegal
SERPAJ addressed the SIJAU meeting in Buenos Aires with a plea for
amnesty and a demand to the eventual winner of the November elections to
make the armed forces accountable for their actions.17
Besides SERPAJ, other groups acting in Uruguay sent spokesper-
sons to the meeting, among them the Bar Association and the relatives of
political prisoners and disappeared, as well as representatives of the FA
and the unions.18 Although they had all protested abuses inside the
country to the best of their abilities, they had little experience in human
rights activism as such. In Uruguay, the first petition by relatives of poli-
tical prisoners was submitted to the government in 1982, and the first list
of disappeared people was publicized in November 1983. It was not until
June 1983 that SERPAJ first publicly denounced torture and demanded
justice in relation to the abduction of twenty-five members of the youth
branch of the PCU. No legal defense organization emerged until 1981,
when the anti-regime sectors won the internal elections of the Bar
Association for the first time since the coup. The National Commission
for Human Rights and the Uruguayan Institute of Legal and Social
Studies, two other organizations that took human rights cases, were foun-
ded in 1983 and 1984 respectively. Moreover, the coordination of the
human rights movement was only institutionalized in 1984 with the crea-
tion of a “coordinadora” composed of all the human rights organizations,
the three major parties, and the key organizations of the social movement.
This “coordinadora”, however, did not reach beyond Montevideo.19 The
first case to really catch the attention of the media and produce wide-
spread condemnation against human rights violations in the country was
the death of a detainee while being tortured in a military facility in April
1984.20 Beyond a generalized call to end repression and release political
prisoners, human rights were not chief concerns for many political actors
in the transitional period and most parties did not have much contact with
17 See Bustamente, Francisco: “Amnistía y lucha contra el terrorismo de Estado: Condiciones
para la transición democrática”, in SIJAU, Coloquio sobre Uruguay y Paraguay…, pages 86-95.
18 See list of participants in Ibídem, pages 191-196.
19 See Barahona, A.: Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America... pages 84-87.
20 See Perelli, Carina, and Rial, Juan: “La estrategia de las apariencias: Transición a la demo-
cracia y derechos humanos”, in Perelli, C., and Rial, J.: De mitos y memorias políticas: La represión,
el miedo y después…, EBO, Montevideo, 1986, pages 74-79.
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human rights groups.21 The social movements were fervent defenders of
radical human rights claims and constantly mobilized for amnesty, but
remained relatively isolated from the main steps of the negotiated transi-
tion. Coordinating organizations like the Intersectorial and later the
Multipartidaria avoided open statements and tried to preserve the mini-
mal level of shared commitment reached by political parties and social
organizations.22
This situation contrasted with Argentina and Chile, where human
rights groups emerged soon after the installation of the authoritarian regi-
mes in the seventies and played a main role in the transitional periods. In
Chile, these groups took advantage of preexisting social and political net-
works, most of them face-to-face, linking religious leaders, some leftists,
and intellectuals. Trust and personal connections could not have developed
without the Catholic Church acting as a shield of legitimacy in the face of
repression, and channeling international support and funds for this early
human rights work. Initially, these groups had not formal ties to political
parties and carried out a purely humanitarian agenda, but they soon embar-
ked on efforts to reconstitute social spaces fragmented by repression and
fear. Their activities had a “demonstration effect” and in the late seventies
human rights groups proliferated and linked with parties and intellectual
circles. The Catholic Vicaría de la Solidaridad was especially important in
the creation of a national opposition movement, preparing the ground for
larger social and political forces to press for democratization in the eigh-
ties.23 In contrast to Chile, the Argentine Catholic church failed to offer any
kind of support to the human rights groups, which nevertheless organized
in the worst years of repression. Some had been working before the 1976
21 According to interviews with seventy politicians in 1984 and 1985, only 38% of the FA lea-
ders, 21% of the Blancos, and 11% of the Colorados had “frequent” contacts with human rights orga-
nizations. Gillespie, C.: Negotiating Democracy..., page 64.
22 The Intersectorial was created in August 1983 by all the major parties and social move-
ments. The Multipartidaria was composed of the major parties. In late 1984, another coordinating orga-
nization was founded, Concertación Nacional Programática (CONAPRO), with representatives of all
the parties and social movements and the aim of reaching minimal agreements in preparation for the
democratic period. It was within CONAPRO that the first joint commitment about human rights viola-
tions was reached in August 1984. See Barahona de Brito, A.: Human Rights and Democratization in
Latin America..., page 80.
23 See Loveman, Mara: “High-Risk Collective Action: Defending Human Rights in Chile,
Uruguay, and Argentina”, American Journal of Sociology, 104:2, September 1998, pages 488-498; and
Fruhling, Hugo: “Resistance to Fear in Chile: The Experience of the Vicaría de la Solidaridad”, in
Corradi, Juan E., et al. (eds.): Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America,
University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1992, pages 121-141.
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coup and the most important one, the Madres de Plaza de Mayo, appeared
soon after and proved very effective in getting international attention and
support. Their denouncing efforts were central during the Argentine transi-
tion to democracy in 1982 and 1983, after the debacle of the Malvinas war
and ensuing collapse of the military regime.24
According to the literature on democratization processes in the
Southern Cone, several reasons account for the late development of the
Uruguayan human rights movement. When comparing Uruguay to other
South American countries, these studies stress that the Uruguayan Catholic
Church was traditionally weak, had little influence outside a limited “reli-
gious” sphere, and lacked strong historical connections to the major politi-
cal parties or labor organizations. Throughout the authoritarian period, the
Church hierarchy maintained an “official silence”, going as far as to deny
support to SERPAJ in 1981. Besides the poor role of the Church, scholars
dealing with social movements in authoritarian contexts explain that actors
embedded in diverse secular social networks also failed to coordinate and
sustain human rights groups prior to 1981 because of the nature and extent
of repression in Uruguay. They point to both geography and demography
as factors that made it easier for the monitoring and repressive apparatus of
the military government to persecute and paralyze all opposition. The foun-
dations of this apparatus—including severe legal restrictions of individual
freedoms passed by the parliament in the late sixties and early seventies—
were already in place when the military came to power in 1973. Many
potential spaces for organized resistance were restricted or eliminated befo-
re the coup. Ensuing repression was also severe and did not wane until the
very end of the regime; this included massive arrests, generalized torture,
prolonged imprisonment, and intervention in all spheres of life, public and
private.25
Later, in the transitional period, other factors collaborated to weake-
ning human rights claims inside the country and ended up hindering the
implementation of policies of “truth” and justice in the democratic period.
First, party politics were part of the entire transitional process: the 1982
primaries and the 1984 national elections encouraged competitive differen-
24 See Loveman, M.: “High-Risk Collective Action”, pages 507-516.
25 See Ibídem, pages 498-506; and Barahona, A.: Human Rights and Democratization in Latin
America..., pages 86-87. For patterns of repression, see Roniger, Luis, and Sznajder, Mario: The Legacy
of Human-Rights Violations in the Southern-Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1999, pages 20-28.
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tiation among the parties and militated against the undertaking of broad
consensus-building initiatives. The decline of the alliance between the
Blanco leader Ferreira Aldunate and sectors of the left also hampered the
consolidation of a common opposition front behind human rights claims.
Second, the transition was characterized by the increasing importance of
secret elite negotiations between party delegates and the military, coupled
with the decrease in the importance of popular mobilization. Since human
rights groups, particularly SERPAJ, were most strongly linked to the social
movements and emphasized mobilization, the predominance of private eli-
te talks furthered their isolation from the decisive steps of the transition.
The Partido Colorado, which won the 1984 elections, had almost no links
with the social movements and established an associative relationship with
the military command. Third, the transition was agreed between equals: the
military did not succeed in getting the guarantees they initially sought, but
the party representatives were in turn unable to impose a strong break with
the authoritarian institutions. Although the final agreement did not guaran-
tee impunity, it implied the tacit recognition of the military’s institutional
autonomy. Moreover, the pact represented the restoration of the pre-autho-
ritarian political system, including an elaborate electoral arrangement that
exacerbated intra-party fragmentation and promoted programmatic com-
promise to accommodate the different factions inside the same grouping.26
Scholars studying the role of human rights in transitions to democracy
usually add “lack of international attention” as another factor to explain the
weak development of a human rights movement inside Uruguay and the
ensuing failure to implement policies of “truth” and justice. One of these
studies notes that, contrasting with other South American countries under
authoritarian rule in this same period, few missions visited Uruguay to
monitor human rights.27 Another scholar stresses that the traditional parties’
lack of international counterparts, together with the ineffective role of the
Church, severely limited access to external funding for human rights pro-
jects.28 Both observations are partly right and the first comparison identifies
the hostility with which Uruguayan authorities greeted international pre-
ssure. It overlooks, however, the importance of missions sent by the
International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International (AI) in
26 See Barahona, A.: Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America..., pages 80-97.
27 See Ibídem, pages 87-88.
28 See Loveman, M.: “High-Risk Collective Action”..., pages 506-507.
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1974 and 1975, the U.S. Bar Association in 1977, and the Red Cross and
the OAS in 1979, among others. In addition, there were several pronounce-
ments by international organizations and foreign governments, the most
important being the 1976 decision by the U.S. Congress to suspend all mili-
tary aid to Uruguay because of its human rights standards. A small and not
very prominent member of the international community, Uruguay did get a
fair deal of attention, looming high on the agenda of chief human rights
groups like AI in the seventies. It may be true that the “slow motion coup
was eclipsed by the violent coup in Chile” and that “the relative absence of
disappearances…may also have made Uruguay seem less worthy
of…attention”.29 But it is undeniable that the exiles managed to dissemina-
te human rights abuses to large international audiences, pointing to the spe-
cificity of repression in their country.
It is puzzling that, despite succeeding in getting international atten-
tion, the exiles’ commitment to human rights activism did not substantially
affect politics inside Uruguay in the transitional period. The literature on
transitions to democracy in the Southern Cone addresses this point when it
relates exile politics to domestic disregard for human rights and suggests
that the breakdown of the alliance in exile between Blancos and leftists hin-
dered the promotion of a unified human rights agenda. Equally important
was the reorientation of the leftist exiles towards transitional politics in
Uruguay, somewhat diminishing their concern for transnational human
rights activism. Both inside and outside the country, the groups committed
to strong human rights agendas lost terrain to the negotiating sectors.30 The
only consensual motto in this period was freedom for political prisoners,
probably because they were too many to be disregarded.31 However, transi-
tional dynamics led the majority of the left to endorse the August 1984
agreement between party representatives and the military when there were
still hundreds of prisoners. It was not until early 1985, after the end of the
authoritarian regime, that a “National Pacification Project” provided for
29 Barahona de Brito, A.: Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America..., page 87.
30 The plenum of the FA voted in favor of the terms of the agreement with the military 31 to
14 (with 6 abstentions). See Gillespie, C.: Negotiating Democracy..., page 178. Electoral results in
November 1984 confirmed the appeal of the negotiating stance. The IDI got 1.4% of the total vote
(6.7% of the FA), while the pro-pact sectors got 19.9% (93.1% of the FA). Caetano, Gerardo, et al.:
La izquierda uruguaya: Tradición, innovación y política, Trilce, Montevideo, 1995, pages 150-151.
31 According to interviews conducted in 1984 and 1985 with Uruguayan politicians, 68% of
the FA leaders, 57% of the Blancos, and 48% of the Colorados reported having been detained for poli-
tical reasons. Gillespie, C.: Negotiating Democracy..., page 34.
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their rapid release. Moreover, the pact eluded any commitment to puni-
shing the accused of human rights abuses. The very decision to avoid the
matter showed that finding a rapid way out of the current situation was con-
sidered more important than demanding “truth” and justice for human
rights violations committed by the outgoing regime. For the left, this was a
weighty decision, since leftist activists and leaders had been the main tar-
gets during the authoritarian period. How did the different leftist groups
and parties talk about these issues, which were central to their political
identity, in a time when the majority of the left decided to tone down con-
crete human rights claims?
Heroism Revisited
Starting in the mid-seventies, as human rights arose as a central factor
in international politics, the exiles became pioneers in adopting this langua-
ge to talk about repression and abuses in Uruguay. Contrasting to the left’s
previous way of referring to these matters, the new language was aimed at
denouncing the methods of the state rather than at praising the attributes of
the affected militants, who were usually presented as “victims” rather than
as political or social combatants. The leftist exiles never dropped referen-
ces to the heroism of their fallen comrades, but they began to talk about
abuses not so much as part of their expected political experience but as
proofs of their ability to resist a brutally repressive regime. They also lear-
ned how to adapt their language according to the audience they were
addressing. There were some attempts at actually marrying leftist heroism
and human rights talk in a more articulate discourse, but none of them was
really successful in the pre-transitional period. Human rights activism was
usually kept separate from partisan politics. The early eighties brought an
interesting change, since the exiles further directed their attention to
domestic politics where human rights claims had not been previously
important and soon began to collide with the negotiating strategies of the
majority of the left acting inside the country. Human rights had represen-
ted a moderate language useful to seek support from international organi-
zations, foreign governments, and transnational actors when the exiled
leftists had no capacity to strike in their domestic arena. Now this langua-
ge was often deemed too radical to fit the leftist coalition’s negotiating
approach to transitional politics in Uruguay.
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The key controversy in using human rights language in this period
was not so much the denouncing of abuses as the attempt to confront the
repressive, legal, and political legacies of the military regime. A basic dis-
tinction between claims for punishing the accused of human rights viola-
tions (justice) and the wish to know what happened and spread this
knowledge to the society at large (“truth-telling”) is useful to understand
how the leftists dealt with these matters.32 According to this analytical dis-
tinction, the left split in two camps defined by the same partisan attach-
ments that determined general strategies in the transitional period. Both
inside and outside the country, the more radical leftists demanded not only
“truth-telling” but also justice, while the negotiating sectors focused on
protesting violations rather than on demanding the punishment of those
guilty of committing and ordering abuses. The former directed their claims
to the political parties, which would eventually take control of the govern-
ment in the impending democratic period. Together with the emerging
human rights groups and social movements, they wanted all the major
parties to commit to investigating and penalizing human rights violators,
revealing the institutional and systematic nature of repression. The nego-
tiating sectors—the majority of the left—preferred to avoid a strong posi-
tion on these matters: they referred to the competence of the judicial system
to prosecute all alleged criminals once it recovered its autonomy, but did
not outline any concrete government policy to enforce successful prosecu-
tion. The main points distinguishing these leftists’ agenda from the timid
human rights proposals of the traditional parties were an explicit demand
to clear up the situation of the disappeared and their support for an un-
restricted amnesty for political prisoners.33
While differing in their positions on how to bring about justice for
human rights violations, these two roughly defined camps converged in
wanting to publicize what their activists had endured in the past decade. In
the last years of the authoritarian regime, all the leftist groups and parties
intensified their testimonial exercises as part of their overall political state-
ments. In some cases, as in this document by the PVP, “truth-telling” and
justice came together:
32 “Truth-telling” refers to the efforts by different social and political actors to ascertain tho-
roughly and confront the knowledge of what happened in the past, rather than to the actual accuracy of
one particular version. See Roniger, L., and Sznajder, M.: The Legacy of Human-Rights Violations in
the Southern-Cone..., page 1.
33 For further analysis of individual party platforms on this matter, see Barahona, A.: Human
Rights and Democratization in Latin America..., pages 92-95.
VANIA MARKARIAN
AEA, 64, 1, enero-junio, 2007, 111-140. ISSN: 0210-5810128
“In order to be able to judge militarism, the Uruguayan people should know what
happened in all these years in the jails of the regime. They should know about the pri-
soners who died while being tortured; they should know what happened with the poli-
tical prisoners who disappeared; they should know how the OCOA [Organismo
Coordinador de Operaciones Antisubversivas, Coordination of Anti-Subversive
Operations] and other services were devoted to political repression”.34
In other cases, the leftists’ urge to talk about imprisonment, torture,
disappearances and other similar experiences was not directly commensu-
rate with their concern about concrete policies to achieve successful prose-
cution against those allegedly responsible for these abuses, which was
often deemed a matter of complex political transactions. A clear example
can be found in the communist journal Estudios, which included a section
“Testimonios del horror y el heroísmo” for party members who had been in
jail to recount their experiences. They detailed prison conditions and
methods of torture but did not specify the implications of their testimonies
to the promotion of justice. In 1983, as the transitional period advanced, the
section disappeared altogether.35
Many of the leftists’ testimonies did not identify those responsible for
the alleged crimes but pursued two goals somewhat independent from the
issue of criminal prosecution. First, they aimed at communicating their
experiences to wide audiences and making the society at large acknowled-
ge what they had gone through. Second, they tried to explain the purpose
of extreme experiences in leftist politics. Heroic appeals permeated these
debates. Like the language of human rights, these appeals presented repre-
ssion as a systematic practice of the authoritarian regime. They differed
from this language, though, in highlighting the ideological and political
attachments of those who committed and those who endured abuses, as
well as in connecting human rights claims with their fight for further poli-
tical and social change. Different sectors of the left agreed in that almost a
decade of repression and abuses uttered evidence of their own resilience
and continuous strength to resist the brutality of the right-wing authorita-
rian regime. Likewise, successive series of leaders and militants impriso-
ned, tortured, and murdered by the military were listed to show the extent
34 “Por la amnistía general e irrestricta para todos los presos y perseguidos por el régimen”,
May 1983, in PVP, La lucha contra la dictadura…, page 212.
35 See for instance “Vicisitudes, horrores y triunfo de Alcides Lanza”, Estudios, 76-77,
December 1980, pages 128-140, and Sacchi, Hugo: “No hay que ser un héroe, solamente ser humano”,
Estudios, 84, October-December 1982, pages 60-71.
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of repression against those willing to defend their principles. The more
casualties of the left, the stronger the opposition to the government, seemed
to be the rationale at work.
An attempt to dissociate themselves from any form of weakness and an
emphatic denial of cases of “treason” and collaboration among their ranks
highlighted the depth of their commitment to fight the regime. This was par-
ticularly important for the communists, who had engaged in underground
activity and endured the bulk of repression, especially imprisonment, all
along the years of authoritarianism. They concocted a sort of “code of
honor”, according to which the PCU had been the “backbone of popular
resistance in Uruguay,” with new generations taking their place as soon as
leaders and cadres were jailed, tortured, or killed. In addition, the commu-
nist leaders pleaded that none of their cadres had “misbehaved” while being
tortured. Acknowledging that other leftists had also endured torture without
acquiescing to collaborating with the military, they would show their appre-
ciation saying that they had “behaved like communists”. Other leftists
understandably resented this talk, rather because they claimed that most of
them had paid a high toll in confronting the regime than because they were
ready to acknowledge the existence of “traitors” among their ranks.36
When compared to the political language of the late sixties and early
seventies, the ultimate meaning of sacrifice in the new heroic appeals had
somewhat changed. First, in agreement with a basic feature of human rights
discourse, abuses were not so much something to be expected in the poli-
tical experience of an activist as they were the manifestation of a brutal
system that aimed at curbing all dissent. In the new heroic language, the
underlying idea was that the leftists had been up to their standards of self-
sacrifice, but denouncing what they had endured was more important than
describing their remarkable attributes. Second, now the higher goal deser-
ving total devotion was not so much revolution and socialist change, but to
recover democracy and defend the civil and political rights suppressed by
the regime.37 Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz, two parliamen-
36 For the PCU, see Arismendi, R.: “En el 61 aniversario del PCU: Forja y temple para la vic-
toria sobre el fascismo”, Estudios, 80, Octubre 1981, pages 2-15, and Saxlund, Ricardo: “Estos jóve-
nes 63 de nuestro partido”, Estudios, 87, July 1983, page 51. For debate with other leftists, see Aportes,
December 1984, in FUK-IISH.
37 Discussions about current developments in Poland showed that some leftist groups had
adopted a similar discourse to talk about events other than repression and abuse in Uruguay. See for ins-
tance “La crisis en Polonia”, January 1982, in PVP, La lucha contra la dictadura…, pages 165-171, and
“Por una democracia verdadera en Uruguay”, Diálogo, July 1983, pages 98-101, in Uruguay
Koordinatie Komitee, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam.
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tarians assassinated in Buenos Aires in 1976, were probably the first
“martyrs of democracy” to be anointed by the exiled left in the late seven-
ties.38 Although not all the leftist groups and parties embraced this “demo-
cratic martyrdom” with equal passion and at the same time, traces of it
were present in most of their statements during the last days of the autho-
ritarian regime.39 This was an operation bound to elicit sympathy outside
the membership of these groups and parties, in agreement with the presen-
tation of the left as a reliable political actor.40
More generally, these new ways of talking about the recent past indi-
cated an ongoing reconsideration of leftist conceptions of politics and
social change. This revision had its roots in previous efforts to redirect poli-
tical activities, exemplified in their involvement in transnational human
rights activism since the second half of the seventies. At approximately the
same time, an important group of South American exiled intellectuals,
most of them from Argentina and Chile, began to search for new concep-
tual tools to understand authoritarianism in the region. Besides drawing on
their own political experiences, the intellectuals participated in current
debates among Marxist thinkers, which involved theoretical rumination
and critical examination of recent developments in the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries, as well as the pitfalls of European welfare states
and Latin American populisms. In brief, this search led them to exalt poli-
tical democracy as a desirable goal and advocate peaceful transitions out of
the current situation in their countries. This new credo expressed not only
their opposition to the “new authoritarianisms” in South America, but also
fundamental departure from previous notions of revolutionary actions and
socialist transformation.41
Although there were no such systematic efforts to reconsider ideolo-
gical foundations among Uruguayan exiles, intellectuals or otherwise, it is
38 See Markarian, Vania: “Uruguayan Exiles and the Latin American Human Rights
Networks, 1967-1984”, Columbia University, Ph.D. Dissertation, 2003, pages 191-193.
39 The PCU, for instance, justified its claim for amnesty noting that “The Uruguayan demo-
cracy cannot lay aside…those who have paid with imprisonment, torture, sacrifice, and effort the con-
quering of these very same [democratic] perspectives”. See Arismendi, R.: “Con la acción de las masas
y la concertación de todas las fuerzas hacia una democracia avanzada”, Estudios, 89, January 1984,
page 24. See also the analysis of the “Roslik case” in Perelli, C., and Rial, J.: “La estrategia de las apa-
riencias…”, pages 75-77.
40 For the relationship between “martyrology”, democracy, and presentation of the left as a
legitimate political player, see also de Sierra, Gerónimo: “La izquierda de la transición”, in Gillespie,
Charles, et al. (eds.): Uruguay y la democracia, 3 vols., EBO, Montevideo, 1984, pages 3:156.
41 For extensive analysis of these debates, see Lesgart, Cecilia: Usos de la transición a la
democracia: Ensayo, ciencia y política en la década del 80, Homo Sapiens, Rosario, 2003.
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clear that these debates permeated their politics. Together with the magni-
tude of repression in their country, which surpassed any previous experien-
ce, a newfound interest in the ideas of Antonio Gramsci affected the recon-
sideration of their role in the promotion of social and political change.
Rather than part of a sophisticated theoretical revision, Gramscian referen-
ces to “hegemony” were loosely used to moderate the idea of politics as
confrontation, which had been of main importance before the dictatorship,
differentiating between political and social conflicts and encouraging the
perception of politics as the joint creation of a sphere for peaceful partici-
pation and debate. These ideas, in turn, eroded the importance of traditio-
nal Leninist notions of “vanguard”, despite some willful efforts to marry
the view of the two Marxist thinkers. Beyond ideological nuances and
theoretical speculation, the new heroic discourse, with its emphasis on
exposing abuses and exalting democracy, mean a clear departure from for-
mer understandings of the left as a conscious vanguard, which would
enlighten the otherwise dormant masses.42
Another important novelty in the heroic appeals of the leftists was that
exile was now presented as an evidence of their sacrifice. In previous years,
exile was not stressed as a particularly traumatic experience, probably
because it was deemed mild if compared to what other leftists were endu-
ring inside the country. Exile was included in the SIJAU’s amnesty propo-
sal and there had been some interest on the topic by writers and intellec-
tuals, but political leaders and activists did not analyze their expatriation
until the political opening in Uruguay suggested that it was bound to end
soon.43 This new concern was in tune with the proliferation of personal tes-
timonies on the different forms of government repression in the country,
evidencing the need to share a series of experiences that could not be publi-
cized in the authoritarian period. All these narratives stressed the political
meaning of individual trajectories. In the case of the exiles, their testimo-
nies embraced “exile identity” as a condition forced upon them, yet another
42 For an example of Leninist approach to Gramscian views, see Arismendi, R.: “La poblada
soledad de Antonio Gramsci”, in Arismendi, R.:Vigencia del marxismo-leninismo, Grijalbo, Mexico
City, 1984, pages 163-179. For further analysis of this matter, See Rico, Álvaro: “¿Por qué Gramsci?”,
in Vigencia y actualización en el pensamiento de Rodney Arismendi, Fundación Rodney Arismendi,
Montevideo, 2001, pages 177-190. For Gramsci’s impact on the South American left, see Lesgart, C.:
“El tránsito teórico de la izquierda intelectual en el Cono Sur de América Latina: ¿Reforma moral e
intelectual o liberalismo político?”, Revista Internacional de Filosofía Política, 16, December 2000,
pages 28-31.
43 For the treatment of exile in the work of Uruguayan writers, see Kaminsky, Amy K.: After
Exile: Writing the Latin American Diaspora, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1999.
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expression of the determination of the left before the brutality of the autho-
ritarian regime.44
The consolidation of this “exile identity,” however, did not result in
any specific “exile voice” in transitional politics in Uruguay. Partisan
attachments continued to define the positions of the leftists, both inside and
outside the country. There was a conscious effort by leftist groups and par-
ties to emphasize their internal unity, despite the fact that their activists had
endured totally different experiences in the past ten years. Once again, the
communists were probably the ones to give this idea the rawest formula-
tion: “We were one party in exile, in prison, or underground”.45 But the will
to underscore continuity over disruption, even when talking about extreme
experiences, was of main importance for all leftists at this point. It expre-
ssed a common concern about rebuilding spaces for social and political
mobilization harshly repressed and systematically dismantled in previous
years. The main challenge was to bring together activists who had engaged
in very disparate and often disconnected ways of resistance to authoritaria-
nism. There were many debates on how to achieve this goal, but all the left
strove to merge the new and powerful social movements that burst in the
public scene during the transitional period with those smaller but fervent
groups who had been acting underground and abroad.46
In the case of the exiles, an interesting aspect of this emphasis on
unity was the reaffirmation of national origins. As soon as it was clear that
their expatriation was ending, references to returning to Uruguay as the
political duty of every exile began to flood speeches, journals, and newsle-
tters. Leaders of the PCU were particularly worried about this matter, insis-
ting on the differences between emigrants and exiles, in which the latter
were not only defined in political terms but also attributed an intense desire
to go back to work for the well-being of their homeland.47 In fact, most of
44 For a preliminary list of testimonies, see Coraza de los Santos, Enrique: “El Uruguay del
exilio: La memoria, el recuerdo y el olvido a través de la bibliografía”, Scripta Nova, 94:1, August
2001, http://www.ub.es/geocrit/sn-94-46.htm.
45 See, for instance, Arismendi, R.: “A votar por el Frente Amplio y por una democracia avan-
zada”, Estudios, 92, December 1984, pages 61-63.
46 There were complex, and ultimately successful, consultations to rebuild the Frente Amplio,
which had suffered many defections both inside Uruguay and abroad. Likewise, leftists strove to keep
the unity of the labor and the student movements, bringing together the younger generation acting insi-
de the country since 1983 and the older activists who had lived in exile or been in jail in previous years.
For the labor movement, see my interview with Ricardo Vilaró, Montevideo, December 26, 2001. For
the student movement, see recent debates posted on the website www.semana83.com.
47 See, for instance, Arismendi, R.: Marx y los desafíos de la época y cinco trabajos más, La
Hora, Montevideo, 1985, page 24.
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the exiled leftists began to talk about their imminent return, to depict
Uruguay with increasingly nostalgic overtones, and to instill the idea that
the “reconstruction of our fatherland” was the most immediate responsibi-
lity of each exile. Likewise, the death of one of them was presented as a
remarkably tragic event, not only because of what their fellow Uruguayans
would miss in terms of their contributions during the approaching demo-
cratic period, but also because of a concern about giving them a proper
burial in “our soil”. Lamentations for the death of Enrique Erro in Paris
in October 1984, for instance, elaborated on the customary connection
between national identity and the land where “our ancestors are buried”.48
In a similar vein, there were efforts to set up some actual channels to
return, such as the organization of a group of children of exiles to visit
Uruguay. With the help of several Spanish political and social organiza-
tions, 154 children aged one to fifteen left Madrid on December 25, 1983.
An enthusiastic crowd welcomed them in Montevideo and several social
organizations planned tours and other activities to show them a country
most of them knew only through the tales of their parents and the letters
from their relatives.49 Keeping alive in their children the sense of being
Uruguayan was an important concern for the exiles, expressed in the seve-
ral “weekend schools” and other cultural activities they launched all over
the world. After 1980, when the possibility of returning seemed closer, they
intensified these efforts to make their children share their will to go back.
These initiatives showed to what extent the political was intertwined in the
personal lives of the exiles, both in their decisions to go back to their
country in the mid-eighties as in their reasons to leave throughout the
seventies.50
The rally that welcomed the “children of exile” in 1983 was the first
of a series of demonstrations that cheered returning exiles in the streets of
48 See obituaries for Erro reproduced in Caula, N.: El diario de Enrique Erro…, pages 202-
209. See also “Ante la desaparición del Dr. Carlos Quijano”, Estudios, 91, July 1984, page 59. For the
idea of “proper burial”, see Vendery, Katherine: The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and
Postsocialist Change, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, pages 41-50.
49 See, for instance, Scherzer, Alejandro, and Saavedra, Carlos: “154 niños: De la efervescen-
cia popular a la implicación institucional”, Boletín del Centre International de Recherche, 8, 1986.
50 For “weekend schools”, see “Emigración, educación y retorno”, Estudios, 82, October-
December 1982, pages 72-83. On the impact of both personal and political factors in the decision to
return, see Martínez Moreno, Carlos: “Marco político para un retorno del exilio”, in Martínez Moreno,
C.: Ensayos, 2 vols. Cámara de Senadores, Montevideo, 1994, pages 2:63-73. For other initiatives to
go back, see “La campagne pour le retour des exiles au pays”, Uruguay Informations, April 1984, pages
21-23, in NACLA 3.
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Montevideo between mid 1984 and early 1985. Some political leaders and
other personalities were warmly received in these months, including the
Blanco leader Wilson Ferreira Aldunate and his son Juan Raúl, communist
leaders Enrique Rodríguez and Rodney Arismendi, and folksingers Daniel
Viglietti, Alfredo Zitarrosa, and Los Olimareños. Some of them had al-
ready been welcomed by fellow exiles in Buenos Aires, which after the
recovery of democracy in Argentina in late 1983 became once again a
bridge between Uruguay and the larger world, mirroring its role in the early
seventies. In addition to popular demonstrations, a series of other under-
takings expressed a systematic effort to bring back the thousands of
Uruguayans who had been sent into exile in the past decade. A Comisión
Nacional del Reencuentro (CNR, National Commission for the Re-
Encounter) was founded in December 1983 with representatives of the
major parties. The CNR devised a series of programs to help the exiles
readapt to their country, including some legal matters such as recovering
their jobs in the public sector, transferring credits from foreign universities,
and helping their children adjust to the Uruguayan educational system.51
The Servicio Ecuménico de Reinserción was also founded in 1983 to help
returning exiles, and in 1984 a group of psychologists and social workers
received international funds to launch the Servicio de Rehabilitación
Social, a support organization for former prisoners and exiles.52
These undertakings expressed a growing concern about the extent and
consequences of the different forms of repression in Uruguay, as well as a
determination to help the exiles return and settle down in their country. Aid
from international organizations was of main importance in providing the
exiles with financial means to accomplish these goals. It also paid for seve-
ral projects aimed at understanding the phenomenon of exile from an aca-
demic perspective. In the eighties, organizations from countries that had
received Uruguayan exiles supported studies on this matter. Many of these
projects were carried out by Uruguayan exiles working at research institu-
tions in Europe and the United States. Ties with transnational human rights
groups also continued well into the democratic period, both as ongoing aid
for victims of abuses and as efforts to spur human rights activism in the
51 This CNR was the antecedent to the Comisión Nacional de Repatriación (National
Commission of Repatriation) created by the Colorado government in April 1985. It provided aid to
16.000 returning exiles, including jobs, medical insurance, and housing. See Barahona, A.: Human
Rights and Democratization in Latin America..., page 125.
52 See Coraza de los Santos, E.: “El Uruguay del exilio…”.
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country. AI, for instance, kept giving financial aid to ex-prisoners, and
lobbied politicians and upcoming civilian authorities to set up AI chapters
in Uruguay.53
Concluding Remarks
All these initiatives constituted the outcome of more than a decade of
transnational activities by the exiles with the aim of making the Uruguayan
situation known to the world. In the transitional period, instead of intensi-
fying their previous human rights activism, the majority of the leftist exiles
reoriented their efforts towards supporting the new political developments
in Uruguay and organizing their return to the country. For the exiles, as for
the rest of the leftists (and for other political and social actors in these
years), the early eighties were a period of reworking their strategies within
the new context of transitional politics. In terms of human rights, this invol-
ved toning down radical claims and accommodating their demands for
accountability to the predominant negotiating strategy. The leftists kept
denouncing abuses, but many of them often stopped short of promoting
concrete measures to punish the accused of these violations. The will to
find a rapid way out of the authoritarian regime was more powerful than
any other goal in these years. In this context, their main purpose of using
human rights language was often testimonial, a means of bearing witness
of what thousands of leftist militants had endured in the past decade. This
also meant revisiting earlier heroic appeals in order to make the society at
large know and understand the extent of their fight against the regime. This
new combination of human rights language and heroic references reflected
the leftists’ attempts to understand their political experiences in the past
decade and make sense of them in the new political situation. Because of
this, other political actors often accused them of trying to cleanse their role
in political violence in the late sixties and avoid their share of responsibi-
lity in the events leading to the 1973 coup.
53 For “aftercare” for former prisoners, see letter from Val Milk to “AIUSA adoption groups,
AIUSA members interested in Uruguay, and Uruguay Co-groups in other sections”, May 23, 1985, in
AIUSA-Uruguay Collection, University of Colorado Archives, Boulder, CO. For all other matters, see
“AI works on Uruguay following the return to civilian rule”, AMR 52/04/85, April 1, 1985; and
“Uruguay relief work 1985 (summary)”, AMR 52/05/85, July 1, 1985, AI Indexed Documents,
Microfilm 371, in International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam.
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Between 1980 and 1984, all the relevant actors discussed what had
happened in the country during the last ten to fifteen years, confronting
their memories while looking for a way out. Like the rest of the political
spectrum, the different groups and parties of the left acted as “agents of
memory”, shaping the “collective remembrance” processes.54 The military
government’s versions of the pre-coup period and the dictatorship had been
the only ones allowed publicly during the years of authoritarianism. Since
1973, the Armed Forces asserted the “historical role” of the military, sha-
ping the urban landscape with monuments and public works that represen-
ted their version of the past.55 Most of the opposition groups had not even
the chance to publicly mourn and pay homage to their fellow party mem-
bers. Therefore, the unexpected opening of the early eighties meant also the
possibility of talking about events that had not been openly discussed for a
decade. The undeniable link between these issues and the very possibility
of the transition to democracy often led to the negotiation of memories in
political terms. In this sense, human rights language, once toned down and
bereft of radical claims for accountability, became a useful tool for presen-
ting the left as a reliable political actor—one that had not only endured the
bulk of repression by the military but that was also willing to give up on
revenge and embrace democratic politics.
This last shift in the Uruguayan left’s use of human rights language
shows that the articulation between local and global issues in the promo-
tion of political change is more complex than the picture offered by the
existing literature on international human rights and transnational net-
works. While the importance of shared ideas and norms is stressed in this
scholarship, closer analysis often makes clear that the networks are not
only the expression of common values and goals, but also sites where di-
fferent actors can advance their own political objectives. Concerned prima-
rily with the creation of international norms, their internalization into
domestic practices, and the role of advocacy networks in promoting moral
principles for international relations, this approach often disregards the
varied interests implicated in promoting human rights on a global scale.
54 For the concepts of “agents of memory” and “collective remembrance” see Sivan,
Emmanuel, and Winter, Jay (eds.): War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1999, page 6.
55 See Cosse, Isabella, and Markarian,Vania: 1975, Año de la Orientalidad: Identidad, memo-
ria e historia en una dictadura, Trilce, Montevideo, 1996; and Marchesi, Aldo: “¿Guerra o terrorismo
de estado? Recuerdos enfrentados sobre el pasado reciente uruguayo”, in Jelin, E. (ed.): Las conmemo-
raciones…, pages 108-124.
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While certainly adding an important dimension to earlier analyses of tran-
sitions to democracy in the Southern Cone, which focused on internal poli-
tics, this scholarship offers a quite simplistic description of the receptivity
to the international discourse of human rights at the local level.56 According
to Thomas Risse and Stephen C. Ropp, for instance, the processes leading
to the internalization of human rights into domestic practice are “truly uni-
versal and generalizable across regions and domestic structures”.57 These
and other authors pay special attention to the initial phases of these proce-
sses, which would follow a “boomerang pattern”: actors repressed at the
local level activate networks, whose members pressure their own states and
third-party organizations, which in turn pressure the state that violates
human rights.58
My work moves in a different direction, analyzing how perceptions of
national politics affected the use of human rights language by Uruguayan
exiles. In the mid-seventies, acknowledging that space for radical activism
was closing up in their country and the larger region, the exiles became
main human rights advocates. Starting in 1980, the “unexpected political
opening” occurred in Uruguay led to a new transformation in their use of
human rights language. More concerned about national politics than about
transnational activism, they adapted to the complex dealings of the transi-
tional period and toned down radical claims for justice. A new heroic rhe-
toric permeated the use of human rights language as a denouncing tool in
the transitional years.
After the end of the dictatorship, the FA leaders did not outline con-
crete policies to deal with violations by the outgoing military regime and
instead promoted the action of the courts, although the matter clearly sur-
passed the conventional duties of the judicial system. In April 1985, human
rights organizations presented charges. The military leadership refused to
56 For the disregard of international factors in the transition to democracy in Uruguay, see for
instance González, L.E.: “Transición y restauración democrática”, in Gillespie, C., et al. (eds.):
Uruguay y la democracia...
57 To that end, they devise a complex “spiral model” heavily reliant on a series of contingent
variables: “If the transnational advocacy network is sufficiently mobilized to keep the norm-violating
government on the international agenda and if that government is vulnerable to such international pre-
ssure, the third phase [tactical concessions to the international human rights community] of our ‘spiral
model’ is eventually reached”. Risse, Thomas; Ropp, Stephen C., and Sikkink, Kathryn (eds.):
The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge University Press,
New York, 1999, page 238. My emphasis.
58 Keck, Margaret E., and Sikkink, Kathryn: Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1998, pages 12-13.
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appear in court. In December 1986, facing increasing resistance by the
military, Blancos and Colorados alleged that the Club Naval agreement had
indeed “implied” a compromise to avoid investigation of human rights vio-
lations. Frente Amplio leaders denied this accusation, but Blancos and
Colorados nevertheless managed to pass a law that waived the right of the
courts to investigate crimes committed by military and police personnel
before March 1, 1985. The failure to promote “truth-telling” and justice
“from above” led to major initiatives “from below”. Non-governmental
organizations, leftist parties, and other political and social actors exercised
their constitutional right to request a national referendum on that legisla-
tion, amidst a wave of popular mobilization. As part of this campaign,
SERPAJ released a “Nunca Más” report, supported by the United Nations
Fund for Victims, religious groups, and the Mac Arthur Foundation.59 This
report was the human rights movement’s response to the failure of the
government to offer substantial information about repression by the autho-
ritarian regime. In the referendum, conducted in April 1989, the forces inte-
rested in annulling the law were defeated by a narrow margin. Although
there have not been many significant developments in the achievement of
either justice or “truth” in the last fifteen years, the matter of human rights
violations in the past dictatorship has repeatedly surfaced in the form of
both legal confrontations and heated discussions about historical memory.
In comparative perspective, the legacy of human rights violations in
Uruguay is similar to the Chilean and Argentine cases in that the matter
was not closed after the transitional period, mainly because the new demo-
cratic governments failed to satisfy demands for justice. In the three coun-
tries, the “trope of national reconciliation” was the main justification for
this failure, but both in Chile and Argentina it also substantiated some
mechanisms of reparation to the victims, the promotion of “truth-telling”
initiatives by the state, and even some tardy efforts to take legal action
against a number of human rights violators. In contrast to its neighbors, in
Uruguay there were neither official truth-telling policies nor state-promo-
ted gestures of reparation.60 The main distinctive feature of the Uruguayan
process is the late formation of human rights groups inside the country,
which left the exiles as almost the only reliable sources of information
59 See SERPAJ, Uruguay Nunca Más: Human Rights Violations, 1972-1985, Temple
University Press, Philadelphia, 1992.
60 The main official measure was the restitution of government jobs to those who had been
fired for political reasons.
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before international organizations and foreign governments until the eigh-
ties. This situation not only points to the extent of internal repression in
Uruguay, which effectively brought political life to a halt for many years,
but also to the difficulties of civil society to generate effective opposition
through channels other than the political system. The strong role of the
political parties, including the left, and their recovered centrality in the
transitional period, together with the secretive and exclusive character of
the negotiated transition and the isolation of the often uncompromising
social movements explain why human rights became a matter of partisan
politics. Even the exiles ended up privileging national party strategies over
transnational human rights work, although they had been pioneers of this
type of activism in previous years.
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